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Libertarianism—and classical liberalism generally—presupposes (or entails) a specific, but 
implicit, conception of liberty. Imagine two lists of property-rights: one list is all those that are 
libertarian; the other list is all those that are not. What determines into which list a property-
right is assigned? If libertarianism is really about liberty, then the determining factor must be 
whether the property-right fits what liberty is (in a sense more abstract than property). It greatly 
clarifies matters to have an explicit theory of this presupposed conception. 
‘Liberty’ in its most general sense means ‘absence of constraint’ (a relevant contrast is 
‘presence of assistance’). The issue here is interpersonal liberty: the absence of constraint on 
people by each other. But what is to be unconstrained? At its most abstract, this must be the 
satisfaction (or fulfilment) of our wants (or preferences). Merely not assisting a want-
satisfaction (not providing a benefit/gain) is quite different from proactively constraining that 
want-satisfaction (proactively imposing a cost/loss). Therefore, abstract liberty is ‘the absence 
of interpersonal proactively-imposed constraints on want-satisfaction’. But for useful brevity, 
‘no proactively imposed costs’ or simply ‘no (proactive) impositions’. This eleutherology is 
the abstract—not propertarian or normative—perfect liberty that libertarianism presupposes. 
There are three obvious problems with this: clashes, defences, and rectifications. 1) 
What if our want-satisfactions clash? I want to do something that proactively imposes on you 
(say by causing smoke), but to stop me would also proactively impose on me (I need fire for 
warmth and cooking). The most libertarian option is to minimise overall proactive impositions, 
with situation-specific compromise or compensation. 2) How far can one go to defend oneself 
from proactive impositions? No so far as to cause ‘overkill’: to proactively impose by 
exceeding anything that is threatened (e.g., mining one’s garden to stop children using it as a 
shortcut). 3) If a proactive imposition occurs, then what would rectify it? Restitution matching 
the imposition; including any risk-multiplier proportional to the statistical chance of the 
imposer’s escaping detection. Some broad interpersonal comparisons of normal cost-
impositions are unavoidable. These solutions constitute a liberty-maximisation policy. 
If such abstract liberty were to be applied or observed in a state of nature, then what 
general things would this entail? Primarily, people want to have ultimate control of the bodies 
that they more or less are. They do not proactively impose on other people by having this, 
unless trivially and reciprocally by merely existing and being composed of resources now 
unavailable. Therefore, liberty entails that they have this. Next, they want to have ultimate 
control of any unused resources they start using, and thereby closely involve in their want-
satisfactions. They do not proactively impose on other people by having this, unless trivially 
and reciprocally by their chosen use and those resources now being unavailable. Therefore, 
liberty entails that they have this. Otherwise, all interpersonal interactions and exchanges need 
to be consensual or they would proactively impose. These three principal, prima facie, positive, 
libertarian rules fit abstract liberty almost perfectly. They maximally internalise externalities 
with respect to want-satisfaction, and are thereby economically efficient (tending to maximise 
overall want-satisfaction). To flout these positive rules infringes liberty prima facie. However, 
problem cases may require the abstract theory or maximisation policy. 
In order to better protect and promote liberty in practice, the above positive rules can 
be instituted as enforceable private property (one added sophistication is similarly derivable 
intellectual property). Consequently, self-ownership and such private property are contingent, 
practical, libertarian rules; and not what liberty or even libertarianism is inherently. 
Moreover, it is a further separate and normative matter whether this positive system of 
liberty-in-practice is moral, just, rights-observing, etc. And, as with the positive theory, this 
can only be conjecturally explained and defended—not given epistemological support. 
A more-detailed explanation of this liberty-centred, critical-rationalist, theory is here. 
